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ABSTRACT
Previous U.S. sugar policy and the alternative of trade adjustment 
assistance are outlined. The impact of eliminating the tariff on im­
ported raw sugar under 1977 conditions is evaluated, with particular 
emphasis on the losses incurred at producer and processor levels. The 
ability of the current adjustment assistance program under the 1974 
Trade Act [P„L. 93-618] to compensate for these losses is assessed. 
Compensation would primarily be limited to the provision of trade re­
adjustment allowances (supplemental unemployment insurance) to labor 
employed in beet processing and cane milling. Eligibility criteria 
would limit payments to a relatively small number of displaced workers 
who are not seasonally employed (i.e. for more than 26 weeks). Despite 
the limitations of the existing program, the adjustment assistance 
concept could be applied in an agricultural context. It is suggested 
that the major features of an agricultural program would focus on com­
pensating for losses in income and asset values at the farm and possi­
bly processing levels, and would cope with displaced seasonally- 
employed labor.
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TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE AND THE U.S. 
SUGAR INDUSTRY
by
Lloyd S. Harbert and David Blandford*
Since the early 19005s the United States has continually faced the 
problem of how much import protection should be provided for the domes­
tic sugar industry. Political debate on the issue has taken up many 
hours of Congressional time and spawned numerous publications. It has 
become quite fashionable to consider sugar protection a political 
rather than an economic question. Emphasis is on the ''optimal5' level 
of protection, i.e., the level necessary to maintain a specific degree 
of self-sufficiency. Despite the fact that protection imposes signifi­
cant costs on consumers and benefits a relatively small number of pro­
ducers, the impact that trade liberalisation might have upon this 
politically vocal group has militated against liberalisation (Johnson). 
As a result, the idea of unilateral reduction of U.S. tariff barriers 
is rarely, if ever, seriously considered.
Since the early 1960's, there has been increasing interest in 
mechanisms for compensating U.S. industries affected by import com­
petition, in order to reduce demands for protection and promote eco­
nomic adjustment. "Adjustment assistance" provisions were first 
introduced by the U.S. in the 1962 Trade Expansion Act (P.L. 89-794). 
They were strengthened and extended in the 1974 Trade Act (P.L. 93- 
618). Although the potential use of adjustment assistance in agricul­
ture has been discussed (Bale), there has been no attempt to evaluate 
its applicability to specific U.S. agricultural industries, such as 
sugar or dairy, which have traditionally been heavily protected. The 
purpose of this study is to provide such an evaluation for the sugar 
industry. The study has two principal objectives:
(1) to estimate the costs and benefits of sugar trade liberaliza­
tion under 1977 conditions, at both regional and national levels; and
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2(2) to evaluate the degree to which the adjustment assistance 
provisions of the 1974 Trade Act could compensate those in the industry 
for the losses incurred through liberalization.
In order to facilitate the achievement of these objectives, the first 
section of the study briefly outlines the structure of the U .S. sugar 
industry, previous sugar policy, and the nature of adjustment 
assistance.
1. THE U.S. SUGAR INDUSTRY, SUGAR POLICY, AND 
ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE
1.1 A Brief Description of the Sugar Industry.^
U.S. consumption of sugar, at roughly 11 million short tons, 
represents 10-11 percent of world consumption. Although world sugar 
demand increased by an average of just over 2 million tons per year 
during the 1970’s, U.S. consumption remained relatively stable. Per 
capita use fell from 102 pounds (refined basis) in 1970 to 91 pounds in 
1979. This was partly due to increased use of corn sweeteners, which 
rose from just over 19 pounds per capita in 1970 to an estimated 37 to 
38 pounds in 1979. Industrial uses of sugar account for nearly two- 
thirds of total annual deliveries in the U.S. The largest uses are In 
beverages; bakery, cereal and related products; confectionery; and in 
fruit and vegetable processing. The fact that the bulk of U.S. sugar 
is consumed indirectly rather than in its crystaline form, is one of 
the major reasons why alternative sweeteners, such as high fructose 
corn syrup, now have considerable potential for substituting for sugars 
from beet and cane. U.S. sugar demand as a whole Is both price and 
income inelastic (Gemmill). Given that the average consumer spends 
less than one tenth of one percent of his/her total income on sugar and 
sugar products, sizable movements in retail prices are required before 
significant adjustments in consumption are made.
The U.S. is a relatively high cost producer of sugar and has 
typically relied on imports to meet 45-55 percent of its domestic 
needs. In recent years, U.S. imports have accounted for 15-18 percent 
of world imports (IBRD). Roughly half of the U.S. total is supplied by 
three counties— the Phillipines, Dominican Republic, and Brazil. In 
1978, these countries provided 18, 16 and 13 percent, respectively of 
total U.S. imports. Between 1974 and 1977, sugar accounted for roughly 
20 percent of the total value of agricultural imports or 2 percent of 
total U.S. merchandise imports (USDA-ESGS).
1/ Several comprehensive descriptions of the U.S. sugar industry 
already exist (e.g., USDA-ERS), the treatment here is therefore 
brief. Unless otherwise indicated, data used were obtained from 
the Sugar and Sweetener Reports (USDA-ESCS/AMS/FAS).
3Out of the 6 million tons of sugar produced domestically, approxi­
mately 55 percent is derived from sugarbeets. Although beets are grown 
in significant quantities in at least 17 states, over 60 percent of 
beet production in 1978 was located in four states ——Minnesota (19 per­
cent), California (19 percent), North Dakota (12 percent), and Idaho 
(11 percent). The remaining 45 percent of total production is derived 
from sugarcane grown in Hawaii (18 percent), Florida (17 percent), 
Louisiana (9 percent), and Texas (1 percent). In 1974, roughly 
12,000 farms in the U .S. grew sugarbeets with an average of 105 acres 
per farm. Approximately, 4,300 farms grew sugarcane with an average of 
189 acres per farm (USDA-ERS). In total, roughly 2 million acres of 
beets and cane are harvested annually.
In 1975, there were 55 sugarbeet processing factories in the 
United States. The majority of these plants (32) were built before 
1920 (United Beet Sugar Association). In 1976, approximately 18,000 
persons were employed in beet processing and 7,500 in the milling of 
cane. A further 6,000 people were employed in the refining of cane 
sugar (U.S. Dept. of Labor). Unlike beet processors, who produce 
refined sugar directly, cane sugar milling and refining are separate 
activities. The refineries, of which 23 existed in 1975, are located 
mainly near centers of population and close to major ports, since they 
use imported raw cane as well as that produced domestically.
1.2 U.S. Sugar Policy.
Between 1934 and 1974 U.S. sugar policy was expressed in a series 
of sugar acts. Through this legislation, Congress tried to achieve 
several objectives: (i) guarantee a price which would provide an ade­
quate return to farmers; (ii) maintain a level of self-sufficiency that 
would produce a reasonable degree of supply security and price stabil­
ity; and (iii) allow enough foreign imports to provide reasonable 
prices to consumers, A mixture of policy instruments, Including domes­
tic and foreign marketing quotas, direct payments to producers, and 
tariffs and excise taxes was used to achieve these objectives. Because 
of historical circumstance, a well-organized and vocal producer lobby, 
and the threat of curtailment of foreign supplies on several occasions 
the Korean War, the Cuban Missile crisis, and the more recent 1974 
oil crisis— Congress has generally ranked the objectives of stable farm 
incomes and domestic self-sufficiency above low consumer prices.
A major change in policy occurred with the expiration of the last 
act on December 31, 1974. Because of the relatively high domestic 
prices for sugar during 1973/74, consumer groups were strongly opposed 
to renewal of protection on the grounds that the existing act had 
proved a failure in protecting their interests. High prices also made 
abandonment at that time less serious for producers. Congress, sensi­
tive to press coverage of intensive lobbying efforts and allegations of 
unethical practices surrounding the passage of previous legislation, 
was unwilling to revitalize the old system of protection. Conse­
quently, a new sugar act was not passed.
4Even without the protective umbrella of an explicit sugar program, 
other legislation existed through which the industry could receive 
protection.^/ This provided an acceptable substitute for approxi­
mately two years. However, due to rapid accumulation of world stocks 
of raw sugar from 1973/74, imports into the United States increased. 
Because tariff levels were not high enough to restrict this increase, 
domestic prices fell below average costs of production. Acreage 
planted to sugarbeets and cane declined, and workers engaged in beet 
processing and cane milling began to lose their jobs.
On March 17, 1977 the United States International Trade Commis­
sion (ITC) recommended that the sugar industry be granted import 
relief (protection from imports) through the re-imposition of quotas. 
Instead, the President chose a program of income support through direct 
payments. An interim program was introduced in September 1977 under 
which the support price was paid to processors, who then paid this 
price to producers. In November, a price support loan program under 
the 1977 Food and Agriculture Act was implemented. The program was 
similar to many other previous support programs (e.g ., for wheat) in 
which the product was used as collateral for a loan provided by the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). If market prices did not rise 
above the loan rate plus interest charges the CCC would take title to 
the sugar, otherwise, the processor would redeem the loan (sell the 
commodity and pay back the CCC). In order to remove any Incentive for 
low-cost imported sugar to be sold to the CCC, import duties and fees 
were increased to raise the price of Imported raw sugar above the 
support level.
The program operated for the 1977-79 crops. During this time, the 
support price objective was increased and tariffs/duties were altered 
in response to changes in domestic and import prices. Considerable 
debate occurred in Congress on a new sugar program, with major differ­
ences centering on the level of the price support objective and hence 
on the level of protection. U.S. approval of the International Sugar 
Agreement, which was concluded in 1977, was delayed while the debate on 
new legislation continued. The change in sugar market conditions in
1/ Section 301 of Title III of the Agricultural Act of 1949 authorized 
the Secretary of Agriculture to support prices at a level not in 
excess of 90 percent of parity through loans, purchases or other 
operations. In order to guarantee that this price objective was 
maintained, the Secretary could request the imposition of quota or 
tariff limitations on imports under Section 22 of the Act. In 
addition, the President by virtue of Section 204 of the Agricultural 
Act of 1956 could negotitate voluntary export quotas with foreign 
government s.
51979, as world supplies tightened in 1979 and prices rose, made the 
proposed legislation largely irrelevant and it failed to become law.
The recent history of sugar policy has demonstrated the increased 
resistance that proposals for agricultural protect ion can generate. 
Consumer groups are becoming an increasingly vocal and active lobby.
The costs of extending protection to a relatively small number of 
agricultural producers are more visible and controversial, particularly 
in a period of persistent price inflation. Yet, there is little doubt 
that the U.S. sugar industry could be faced with significant adjustment 
costs should low-cost imports be allowed to enter the country for a 
sustained period of time. Recognition of such costs, and the need to 
provide mechanisms to facilitate economic adjustment, lies behind the 
development of adjustment assistance as an alternative to import 
protection.
1.3 Adjustment Assistance.
Even if the term '’adjustment assistance" is restricted to cover 
only those public sector programs which facilitate domestic adjustment 
to import-competition, the range of potential programs is broad. It is 
useful therefore to have some method of classifying programs so that 
the objectives underlying their use are not obscured. Governmental 
efforts to facilitate internal adjustment to import-competition can be 
separated into two broad program categories according to the degree of 
intervention. A passive program is defined as one designed to 
compensate for income losses resulting from import-competition. An 
active program, In contrast, is one which facilitates resource transfer 
from import-sensitive (internationally uncompetitive) areas of 
employment to more viable (internationally competitive) alternatives.
Passive adjustment assistance programs are similar to other pro­
grams which are directed toward Income maintenance. By compensating 
for the losses caused by import-competition, they seek to redistribute 
the gains from trade and indirectly reduce demands for protection.
They are relatively short-run programs which enhance the success of 
implementing a liberal trade policy by creating a visible link between 
potential injury due to imports and redress for this injury. Active 
adjustment assistance programs, on the other hand, are similar to other 
programs that seek to directly promote changes in resource use, e.g. , 
regional development programs. These are not, however, generally as 
effective in reducing demands for protection, as their benefits are not 
as visible to those injured by import-competition and tend to be spread 
over a longer period of time.
There is no theoretical reason why trade-related adjustment should 
be distinguished from that necessitated by other changing economic 
conditions. Most arguments for trade-related assistance apply equally 
well in the case of general assistance program. Basically, the symp­
toms— falling output, prices and profits, increasing inventories and
6rising unemployment— are the same whether they are caused by changes in 
general economic conditions or are the direct result of an increase in 
imports.
Nevertheless, there are several practical reasons why a trade- 
related program may be more desirable than a general aid program.
First, it allows aid to be targeted toward those groups with the great­
est need. A recent survey, for example, found that trade displaced 
workers tended to have lower levels of education than other unemployed 
workers. This fact, and their age, made it harder for them to find new 
jobs and resulted in longer periods of unemployment (Neumann).
A second reason is that changes in imports are often sudden and 
unpredictable. If fluctuations in economic activity caused by changing 
trade patterns are large and difficult to forecast by the private sec­
tor , the potential benefits to society from Increased product ivity can 
be lost because of the influence of private costs and risks to workers 
in changing jobs, and to owners in shifting capital investment. Here, 
adjustment measures act as a government insurance scheme to encourage a 
more efficient allocation of resources in the face of risk and 
uncertainty.
Another plausible reason for granting assistance is to compensate 
those injured by a public policy decision. Past efforts to protect 
certain industries may have given improper market signals to firms and 
workers. Such signals lead workers toward inappropriate career deci­
sions and induce investment in areas where returns are artificially 
high. Although the decision to compensate workers and owners of fixed 
capital depends ultimately on value judgments, it could be interpreted 
as a decision in the national interest. Trade adjustment assistance 
could be viewed as a compensatory payment which redistributes the gains 
from freer trade such that no one is made worse off. In the jargon of 
welfare economics, a potential pareto Improvement is converted into a 
strict pareto improvement.
In the United States, an adjustment assistance program was first 
introduced in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794). Under 
this act, an industry, firm, or group of workers could petition for 
temporary protection (four years maximum) by citing serious Injury due 
to increased imports resulting from trade concessions. If the Tariff 
Commission ruled in favor of the petitioner, the President could desig­
nate firms and workers within the industry el1gible to apply for 
adjustment assistance. An alternative route was for firms and workers 
to bypass the import relief request and apply directly for adjustment 
assistance. Under the Act's provisions, workers could apply for trade 
readjustment allowances (supplemental unemployment insurance), retrain­
ing, and relocation allowances. For firms, there were three forms of 
financial assistance— a direct loan, a guaranteed loan, and tax defer­
ral— and several types of technical assistance to help affected parties 
prepare an adjustment proposal.
7Using the classification suggested above, the 1962 program con­
tained both passive (income transfer) and active (resource realloca­
tion) components. However, it also contained potentially protective 
elements. Firm assistance was primarily aimed at making U .S. firms 
more competitive with their overseas counterparts by subsidizing new 
capital investment. This intent is largely outside the theoretical 
rationale for adjustment assistance, either as a form of compensation 
or an inducement 
tive activities.
The results of the adjustment assistance program under the Trade 
Expansion Act were disappointing. Seven years passed before the assis­
tance provision was first used. Prior to granting aid to employees at 
a mill producing buttweld pipe and tubing in November 1969, the Tariff 
Commission had ruled negatively on six firm and six worker petitions. 
One of the reasons for the lag was that prior to 1969, tariff conces­
sions granted by the United States under the Kennedy round of GATT 
negotiations had little impact. Furthermore, a buoyant economy reduced 
the need for adjustment assistance. Secretary Dillon testified in 1962 
that payments were anticipated to be as high as $70 million per year by 
1967. No payments were actually made until 1970, and total payments at 
the program's expiration in 1975 had amounted to only $85 million 
(Frank, pp. 45-46). Consequently, several original supporters of ad­
justment assistance— notably the AFL-CIO— changed their earlier 
position and opposed its continuation.
As the Tokyo Round of negotiations under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade approached, several bills were introduced into 
Congress which sought to revise and expand the adjustment assistance 
program. Although the Trade Reform bill introduced in early 1973 by 
the Nixon administration cut benefit levels sharply, Congress rejected 
these cuts in Title II of the 1974 Trade Act (P.L. 93-618) by increas­
ing benefits, easing eligibility criteria, and adding a new program to 
assist communities.
As in the previous program, there are two routes by which a group 
of workers, a firm, or a community can apply for, and receive, adjust­
ment assistance under Title II, One route is to petition the Inter­
national Trade Commission for import relief (temporary protection) by 
citing serious injury or a threat thereof due to increased imports.
The ITC, upon determination of the extent of injury, can either 
recommend import relief (duty or tariff, quantitative restriction, or 
orderly marketing agreement) or adjustment assistance when it conveys 
its decision to the President. If the President disagrees with the ITC 
recommendation, he can take alternative action, but such action can be 
subject to Congressional veto. A more direct route to obtain 
assistance is to submit a petition directly to the administrative
for the movement of resources into alternative produc-
1/ Investment subsidies could be justified theoretically if capital ma­
rkets are imperfect or on infant industry grounds. Neither seems 
particularly relevant to the U.S.
8branch that cerifies and delivers the benefits under Title II. Since a 
firm, or a group of workers, must re-petition for adjustment assistance 
regardless of whether the industry was certified for, or denied, Import 
relief, this second route can minimize the administrative lag and 
hasten the delivery of benefits.
Another point relates to the eligibility criteria. Although the 
wording is slightly different for each group, each set of criteria 
focuses on establishing two facts: (i) injury (or threat thereof) and 
(ii) the extent to which the injury was due to increased imports. For 
example, if an industry is to be certified for import relief, the ITC 
must find that increased imports are a "substantial cause" of serious 
injury or threat of injury. The term "increased imports" is inter­
preted as either an increase in actual import levels or the volume of 
imports relative to domestic production. Injury, in turn, is demon­
strated by significant Idling of productive facilities, the inability 
of a significant number of firms to operate at reasonable profit, and a 
significant level of unemployment or underemployment in the industry.
A threat of injury is signaled by a decline in sales, a higher and 
growing inventory, and a downward trend in production, profits, wages, 
or employment.^
Most of the benefits available under Title II are also provided 
under alternative programs in the areas of employment, manpower, and 
regional development. The distinguishing features of the former are 
the eligibility criteria and the level of benefits available per worker 
(firm). The basic reason for this duplication is to be able to dis­
tinguish non trade-related unemployment so that benefit delivery can be 
expedited for the former.
For the workers, there are several types of assistance:
(a) a trade readjustment allowance (70% of weekly earnings 
for a period up to 52 weeks),
(b) counseling, testing, and placement services,
(c) on-the-job and vocational training,
(d) job search allowance, and
1/ The criteria for receiving certification of eligibility to apply for 
community, firm, or worker assistance are similar to those for the 
industry. A major difference Is that increased imports need only 
have "contributed importantly" to the injury. Thus the criteria for 
receiving assistance are seemingly less restrictive than those for 
import relief.
9(e) relocation allowances (80% of necessary expenses and a 
lump sum payment equivalent to three times the worker's 
average weekly wage, up to $500).
For firms, there are two types of assistance— -technical and financial. 
Technical assistance covers 75% of the costs of consultants to develop, 
prepare, and assist in implementing the firm's "economic adjustment 
proposal." Financial assistance includes both loans ($1 million up to 
25 year maturity) and loan guarantees ($3 million up to 25 year matur­
ity) for working capital, modernization, construction, and acquisition 
of land, plant, buildings, and machinery. For communities, the bene­
fits include technical assistance, improvements in public works, and 
measures designed to attract new investments (Frank, p. 63).
2. FREER TRADE AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT IN THE U.S. SUGAR INDUSTRY
In order to evaluate the potential applicability of the trade 
adjustment assistance program to the sugar industry, this section pro­
vides a numerical illustration of the impact of liberalizing U.S. sugar 
trade. Data for 1977 are employed to derive estimates of the impact of 
eliminating the tariff on imported raw sugar (1.875 cents per pound at 
that time) at primarily the producer and processor levels. The basic 
scenario is one in which removal of the tariff causes a fall in domes­
tic farm and retail sugar prices, a reduction in domestic production, 
expansion of domestic use, and an increase in imports. A comparative 
static approach is used to derive estimates of economic impact. In­
stantaneous long-run adjustment to the fall in domestic price is 
assumed to occur. No allowance is made for the fact that the expansion 
of U.S. imports could increase world prices and reduce the size of the 
fall in domestic prices. Since the purpose of the estimates is to 
provide a vehicle for the evaluation the U.S. adjustment assistance 
program, these simplifying assumptions are not unreasonable. Better 
data and improved methods could be adopted but their added contribution 
in the current context would probably not outweigh their additional 
cost.
Estimates are derived for four sugarbeet producing regions and 
three sugarcane regions. The four beet regions— Region 1, an aggregate 
of the USDA-ASCS Red River Valley and Great Lakes regions; Region 2, 
the Great Plains; Region 3, the Northwest; and Region 4, the Southwest 
— conform to those used by Gemmill, whose supply elasticities are 
employed in the analysis. The states, which are represented under each 
of these regional aggregates, are similar both in average cost of pro­
duction and in the geographic market they supply. Because the three 
sugarcane producing regions (Florida, Louisiana, and Hawaii) differ in 
terms of farm size, degree of mechanization in production and process­
ing, and in costs of production, each is dealt with separately.
10
2.1 Effects at the Producer Level.
Table 2.1 contains information on 1977 production of sugar (raw 
value) in the seven regions and their respective shares of the total. 
Also listed are estimates of long-run elasticities of supply derived 
from the recent study by Gemmill. These range from a low of .76 in 
region 6 (Louisiana) to a high of 3.16 in regions 4 (Arizona, 
California) and 5 (Florida). Differences in the size of the elastici­
ties reflect the degree to which substitute crops are significant in 
the regions.
In order to estimate the production effects of freer trade, the 
removal of the 1977 tariff was translated into a percentage reduction 
in the import price of raw sugar (16.9 percent). This percentage fall 
in price was multiplied by the price elasticity to derive an estimate 
of the associated percentage change in product ion and, by application 
to actual 1977 production, the estimated reduction in tonnage. In 
using this method, it is assumed that sugar prices in all regions would 
fall by the same percentage as the import price. The fall in produc­
tion ranges from a low of 13 percent in region 6 to a high of 53 per­
cent in region 5. Total production falls by 28 percent or 1.6 million 
tons. The production percentages were also applied to actual 1977 
acreage to derive an estimate of the reduction in the land used to pro­
duce sugar. Over half a million acres is estimated to move out of the 
crop.
There are likely to be three principal farm-level effects of a 
reduction in sugar production: (1) a loss in farm income; (2) a reduc­
tion in the value of specialized sugar-producing farm machinery; and 
(3) a fall in the payments to, and employment of farm labor.
The losses incurred by producers as the result of the removal of 
a tariff have typically been estimated by computing the change in 
"producers' surplus"— the change in the area above the supply (marginal 
cost) curve as producer price falls (Corden). For a linear supply 
curve, this can be calculated from the following formula
PS
2 2-2tQ P£ + 2t Q - e t Q xp f ^p s p
2(Pf + t)
( 2 . 1 )
where PS - change in producers5 surplus 
t = tariff
Q = quantity produced under protection
P^ - free trade price
e = elasticity of supply s
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Although constant elasticity functions were assumed in computing the 
change in production, the linear approximation (2.1) was applied to 
derive an estimate of the change in regional producers' surplus. Since 
the supply elasticities used were originally derived with respect to 
regional farm prices for beet and the NY import price for cane, these 
prices were also employed in deriving the surplus estimates (table 
2.2). The total loss in surplus is estimated at roughly $174 million. 
The largest loss of $36 million (21 percent of the total) is in region 
7 and the smallest, $13 million (7 percent of the total), is in region 
3.
Producers' surplus, despite widely acknowledged limitations, is a 
useful concept (Currie, Murphy and Schmitz). It provides a relatively 
simple way to estimate the reduction in returns to "fixed" factors of 
production as the result of a fall in the price of output. Different 
producers within a region will probably produce at different levels of 
marginal cost. As the result of the fall in output price, higher-cost 
producers will move out of sugar product ion and therefore experience an 
income loss. Lower-cost producers who remain in production will also 
experience a loss because the factors they employ will earn a reduced 
rate of return. Since the producers' surplus calculation captures both 
these effects (both marginal and intramarginal losses), it is a useful 
overall indicator of the impact of the price fall. However, in the 
current case it does suffer from a number of limitations.
First, it implies an assumption that regional producer aggregates 
are realizing a positive return on their "fixed" factors prior to the 
change in policy— an assumption that may not be justified in all cases. 
Second, it does not take into account the possible offsetting effects 
on producer welfare of the movement of displaced factors (particularly 
land) into alternative crops. A1though separate calculations could be 
made of offsetting gains in producers1 surplus from other products 
these would prove to complex. Finally, the loss of producers' surplus 
captures the reduction in returns to all "fixed" factors, whereas 
adjustment ass istance programs have typically been oriented to dis­
placed factors. For these reasons, two additional indicators of income 
loss were derived on the basis of representative farm budget data 
(USDA- ESCS/AMS/FAS; Oklahoma State University).
The first is an estimate of the gross loss of farm income from 
acreage displaced from sugar production. It is computed by multiplying 
the regional return per acre from sugar product ion (difference between 
receipts and production expenditures excluding an imputed charge for 
land) given in table 2.3 by the number of acres displaced in each 
region (table 2.1). The second is an estimate of the net loss of farm 
income under the assumption that land displaced from sugar production 
moves into the next best alternative crop. Regional returns per acre 
in alternative crops (table 2.3) were used to compute the income gained 
by moving displaced sugar acreage into alternatives, and then subtract­
ed from the gross loss figure to yield the net loss estimate.
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These estimates indicate a gross loss in income under 1977 condi­
tions of $53 million, or 30 percent of the loss of producers' surplus. 
Because available data indicate that Louisiana (region 6) had a nega­
tive net return to sugar production on the average in 1977 its loss was 
set at zero. The net loss calculation yields an aggregate estimate of 
$25 million; less than half the gross loss figure.
When acreage is diverted from beet or cane production, specialized 
farm equipment used in the planting and harvesting of these crops is 
displaced. In order to evaluate the costs of this displacement, 
regional estimates of the value of farm equipment used in the produc­
tion of an acre of sugar were derived (table 2.3). It was assumed that 
machinery would have negligible resale value if displaced. The per 
acre value of existing equipment used in sugar production multiplied by 
the number of acres displaced was adopted as an estimate of the loss of 
its value (table 2.2).!/
Changes in sugar production also affect the use of farm labor. 
Using the same farm budget data employed to derive gross and net farm 
income losses (USDA-ESCS/AMS/FAS; Oklahoma State University), the value 
of labor used to produce an acre of sugar or alternative crops (table 
2.3) was combined with the reduction in acreage (table 2.1) to derive 
estimates of both gross and net reductions in payments to farm labor. 
The gross reduction was estimated at roughly $64 million and the net 
reduction at $56 million. Insufficient data were available to estimate 
the number of workers that would be displaced as the result of these 
adjustments. As discussed below in section 3, detailed estimates of 
labor displacement at the farm level are not required to evaluate the 
applicability of the current adjustment assistance program to those 
displaced.
2.2 Effects at the Processor Level.
The reduction in sugar production resulting from freer trade could 
be expected to lead to the closure of sugarbeet processing plants and 
sugarcane mills. This would create a loss of employment, profits, and 
the value of capital assets represented by the beet and cane factories. 
Cane refineries, unlike cane mills, would not be affected negatively
1/ It may be noted that the net loss of farm income plus the loss in 
equipment value exceeds the producers ’ surplus estimate in some 
regions. These measures are not directly comparable and should be 
considered as alternative (although complementary) measures of 
adjustment costs. It should also be noted that no estimates of 
possible losses in land value are made. In most cases sugar land 
is not so specialized that its value would be substantially reduced 
if used for other crops. However, some reduction in land values 
could occur.
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and in fact would probably benefit from an increase in imports, since 
this would create an expansion in the demand for cane refining capa­
city. No estimates are made of these benefits; attention is focused on 
the costs imposed on beet processors and cane millers.
In order to estimate the loss of processor profits, the average 
profit rate in sugar processing in the U.S. for 1977 given by Citibank 
was combined with an estimate of per unit processsing costs (USDA-ERS) 
to derive an estimate of processor profit per ton. The reduction in 
regional production multiplied by the rate of profit yields an estimate 
of regional profit losses. As table 2,4 indicates, total losses amount 
to roughly $30 million. The profit estimates were then used to esti­
mate the loss in the value of assets resulting from plant closure. 
Profits (the return to fixed assets) were capitalized using the rate of 
return on all assets employed in U.S. manufacturing in 1977 given by 
Citibank.^/ Using this procedure the estimated loss of asset value 
is roughly $200 million.
The impact of freer trade upon labor employed in sugar processing 
is difficult to estimate. A study by the U.S, Department of Labor 
provides some data on the characteristics of the labor force which 
provide a starting point. Two useful pieces of information were 
available— the total number of workers employed in beet processing (all 
U.S.) and in cane milling (by region), and the proportion of workers 
employed by length of employment in each of these aggregates, These 
are contained in sections B and C of table 2.5. Using these data a 
profile of employment characteristics was constructed.
First, assumptions were made about the total number of hours 
worked by an individual in each length of employment class (table 
2.5A), On the basis of a standard 40 hour work week, it was assumed 
that a worker employed for less than 3 months would work 13 weeks (520 
hours); one employed 3-6 months would work 26 weeks (1,040 hours); 6-10 
months-— 39 weeks (1,560 hours); and over 10 months— 48 weeks (1,920 
hours). These end-point assumptions on length of employment were used 
in preference to mid-points because Department of Labor survey infor­
mation on total hours worked suggest that the choice of mid-points 
would result in estimates that would be too low.
Second, information on the proportion of workers by length of 
employment (table 2.5B) was combined with that on the total number of 
workers by region (final column of C in table 2.5) to derive an esti­
mate of the number of workers by region in each employment class
1/ This approach parallels that used in section 2.1 to estimate the 
value of specialized farm machinery displaced from sugar 
product ion.
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(remainder of C in table 2.5). Since data for the separate beet 
regions were unavailable, employment in each region was assumed to 
reflect their share of total 1977 raw sugar production.
Finally, information on the hours worked per worker in each 
employment class (table 2.5A) was combined with the estimated number 
of workers (2.5C) to derive an estimate of total hours worked and their 
distribution by employment class (2.5D).
The estimates of employment by region are given in table 2.4.
Total processing employment is roughly 27,000 persons. Using an 
average wage rate derived from the U.S. Department of Labor and hours 
worked, the estimate of total wages paid is $210 million.
To calculate the likely reduction in processing employment as the 
result of tariff removal, the data on regional employment in table 2.4 
were combined with those on production in table 2.1 to derive regional 
labor-output ratios. The calculated reduction in production under 
freer trade given in table 2.1 was then converted to an estimate of the 
reduction in hours worked. To transform this information into an 
estimate of the number of individuals displaced, the reduction of hours 
worked was distributed across the employment classes in section D of 
table 2.5 by assuming that employees having the shortest duration of 
employment would be the first to be laxd-off.1/ For example, in 
region 1 product ion under freer trade declines by 181 thousand tons„ 
With a labor-output ratio of 7.8 hours per ton this means a reduction 
in hours worked of 1,412 thousand hours. This would imply that all 
1,916 workers employed for less than three months, working a total of 
996 thousand hours, would be displaced. The remaining 416 thousand 
hour reduction would imply a loss of a further 400 jobs in the 3-6 
month employment group (416 divided by the 1.04 thousand hours worked 
per employee in this group). The total calculated displacement for 
region 1 is therefore 2,316 employees.
On the basis of this procedure, estimated total displacement is 
roughly 11,500 persons. The greatest loss occurs in region 4 (27 
percent of the total) and the smallest m  region 6 (just over 4 percent 
of the total). Table 2.4 gives an estimated reduction of wages paid of 
roughly $56 million.
Thrs is a simplistic assumption which may not be fully appropriate. 
Plant closings are likely to be "lumpy", with the reduction in out­
put implying that some plants are forced to close while others 
continue to produce close to capacity. In this case, a smaller 
number of workers would be displaced than calculated by the method 
adopted. If better data were available on plant characteristics 
such as age, capacity, and costs, a more sophisticated estimate of 
displacement could be made.
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2.3 Other Effects.
The reduction in the sugar tariff would have a number of other 
effects, of which the two most important are a reduction in government 
revenue and the lowering of consumer prices. The loss of tariff 
revenue is estimated by multiplying the rate per ton ($37.50) by 1977 
imports (6.138 million tons) and totals roughly $230 million. The gain 
to consumers from lower prices can be estimated by computing the change 
in consumers' surplus from the price r e d u c t i o n . F o r  a linear 
demand curve this is given by
2tQcPf + 2t2Qc - edt2Qd (2.2)
2(Pf + t)
CS “ change in consumer’s surplus 
t = tariff
Qc - quantity consumed under protection
P^ = free trade price
e, = elasticity of demand d
The linear approximation was used with a price elasticity of demand 
for refined sugar of -.24 from George and King and a retail price of 
sugar of $432.4 per ton from U.S. Congress (1979) to derive an esti­
mated gain to consumers from removal of the $37.5 per ton tariff of 
roughly $458 million.Subtracting the loss of producers' surplus 
($174 million) and tariff revenue ($230 million) from this value gives 
an estimate of the "net welfare gain" from liberalization of $54 
million.
CS = 
where
3. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE AND THE SUGAR INDUSTRY
The previous section demonstrated that significant losses could be 
generated from trade liberalization at both the farm and processing 
levels of the sugar industry. The current section evaluates the extent
1/ Simply multiplying the change in price (tariff reduction) by 1977 
total consumption would give a relatively good estimate of the 
consumer gain from tariff removal.
2/ It is assumed that the entire reduction in the wholesale price of 
$37.5 per ton would be passed on to consumers.
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to which the adjustment assistance provisions in Title II of the 1974 
Trade Act could be used to offset these losses and facilitate industry 
adjustment. It also assesses the limitat ions of the current program 
for sugar and other agricultural industries, and outlines the basic 
features of an adjustment assistance program for agriculture.
3.1 Application of the Title II Program to Sugar.
As indicated in section 1.3, the Title II program provides for 
assistance to both firms and workers. Technically, a sugar farmer 
could apply for firm assistance under the Title II program. However, 
because such farmers generally have the ability to shift to alternative 
crops they would probably not pass the injury test (section 1.3), and 
therefore would be ineligible to receive the low interest loans and 
grants provided under the program. Moreover, the intent of the firm 
assistance program is not to compensate for economic loss but to im­
prove firm efficiency by upgrading plant and equipment, and improve 
profitability by promoting diversification. Income losses and decline 
in the value of specialized farm equipment identified as the major 
effects of liberalization in section 2.1, would not be dealt with under 
Title II. Similarly, the economic losses incurred by processors (pro­
fits and value of assets) would also fail to be compensated. Although 
sugar processors might conceivably pass the injury test since their 
plant has few alternative uses, the ability to obtain loans for up­
grading plant and equipment would be of little relevance if the supply 
of their raw material (beet or cane) is eliminated because farmers 
choose not to produce sugar.
Despite the fact that the Title II program would not compensate 
for farmer and processor losses, it could still provide some assistance 
to farm and processor labor. In theory there is no legislative dis­
tinction between this labor and other industrial workers. However, 
eligibility criteria would limit the extent to which these groups could 
gain access to the program's benefits. First, because the program 
excludes workers who have not been employed for a least 26 weeks prior 
to losing their jobs, seasonal labor would not be eligible to receive 
benefits under the program. A recent report (U.S. Congress, 1978) 
estimates that roughly 73 percent of the 53 thousand workers involved 
in U.S. sugar production (excluding Puerto Rico) in 1977 was seasonally 
employed. Second, in some areas a substantial proportion of the total 
workforce is foreign. In Florida, for example, 86 percent of the 10 
thousand seasonal workers in 1977 were from outside the U.S. Third, 
some of the labor displaced is likely to be operator and family labor. 
It is difficult to see how these could be compensated under Title II.
Some of the sugar production workforce would probably be able to 
establish eligibility, most notably in Hawaii. Because of the favor­
able climate these workers are employed year-round. Furthermore, they 
possess the advantage (in terms of gaining access to the program) of
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being unionized. Of the 4,550 production workers employed in the 
Hawaiian sugar industry in 1977 (U.S. Congress, 1978), the 15 percent 
reduction in production under free trade (table 2.1) would imply the 
elimination of approximately 675 jobs (calculated by multiplying the 
1977 labor-output ratio by the fall in production). All these workers 
would be eligible for supplement unemployment payments equal to 70 per­
cent of their annual wage for a maximum period of 52 weeks. Assuming 
an average wage rate of $6 per hour and a 40 hour workweek this would 
imply payments of roughly $8.4 million ($12,400 per worker).1
To some extent, labor employed in sugar processing would be 
affected by the same seasonal labor exclusion that would limit access 
by production labor to Title II assistance. On the basis of the 
results derived in section 2.2, an estimate of the number of workers 
eligible for supplemental unemployment compensation can be derived. In 
table 2.5 a profile of processing employment was presented. This 
information was used to estimate the number of workers displaced by 
trade liberlization. In table 3.1 the number of displaced workers who 
were estimated to be employed for more than 26 weeks, and therefore who 
would be eligible for assistance is given. Total costs of fully com­
pensating these workers for both the hours they would actually have 
been employed in 1977 and at 70 percent of their weekly wages for the 
52 week maximum under Title II is presented, as is parallel information 
for all displaced workers.
As table 3.1 demonstrates, because of the seasonal employment 
rule (less than 26 weeks) the coverage under Title II would be limited. 
Of the total of over 11 thousand workers displaced, less than one 
thousand would be eligible for assistance. In three regions (1, 2 and 
6) no workers would receive compensation. Because of the higher 
proportion of full-time workers In Hawaii (region 7) displaced labor in 
this area fares much better than in other areas _60 percent of those 
displaced would be eligible for compensation.
Payments to workers under Title II would amount to a maximum of 
$8.5 million. This represents only about 15 percent of the total loss 
in wages of $57 million. Under the 52 week maximum, eligible workers 
would receive payment equal to 87 percent of their loss in wages. If 
all displaced workers were to be compensated at the 52 week rate, the 
total cost would be almost $ 100 mi 11 ion and would be roughly 75 percent 
higher than the actual loss of wages.
1/ U.S. Dept, of Labor gives a wage rate for Hawaiian field workers in 
1973 of $4.09 per hour, plus $1.56 in fringes. The $6 rate assumed 
is probably conservative.
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3.2 Assessment of the Program and Suggested Modifications.
Changes in the eligibility criteria and increasing awareness of 
the adjustment assistance program have resulted in substantial in­
creases in Title II expenditures relative to those under the previous 
Trade Expansion Act (TEA) program. During the first two years of its 
operation (1975-77) expenditures were more than twice as great ($220 
million) as under the entire twelve years of the TEA ($85 million). 
These benefits have taken the form of supplemental unemployment compen­
sation (trade readjustment allowances) to displaced workers, a high 
proportion have gone to a few states e .g ., Michigan, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania, and to a limited number of industries, mainly automo­
biles, apparel, steel, electronics, and footwear (U.S. Congress,
1977).
Although several agricultural industries, including sugar, have 
applied for adjustment assistance in the last few years, agricultural 
expenditures have been limited. As indicated above, there are several 
important limitations in using Title II in agriculture. First, the 
program is not designed to compensate fully for the major economic 
losses that result from increased import competition. Its primary role 
has been to provide supplemental unemployment compensation to workers. 
If a major justification for providing adjustment assistance is to 
promote adjustment at all levels, compensation should be provided for 
losses in farm income, in the value of capital equipment, and possibly 
land.
A second problem with the Title II program is that it was essen­
tially designed for nonagricultural industries such as textiles, elec­
tronics, steel, and shoes. These industries tend to be concentrated 
geographically and employ workers throughout the year. In contrast, 
most agricultural industries are widely dispersed and are a major 
source of seasonal employment in rural areas.
These problems do not imply that adjustment assistance could not 
play an expanded role in dealing with agricultural import competition. 
However, special provisions would be needed that would recognise the 
unique characteristics of the sector. These provisions could be intro­
duced as part of specific agricultural program legislation (e.g., a 
future Food and Agriculture Act).
A specifically agricultural adjustment assistance program would 
need to be small-firm oriented and designed to compensate for loss of 
income and asset value resulting from expanded import competition. A 
"passive" approach, employing lump-sum payments to offset losses, would 
seem to be the basic principle upon which specific legislative provi­
sions could be developed. Similar provisions could be devised to 
compensate for profit or asset value losses in agro-industries (e.g., 
sugar processing). However, whether the degree of support (and 
possibly need) for such compensation would be as strong as at the farm 
level is not clear.
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In terms of agricultural labor, the program would have to account 
for the seasonality of employment and the importance of operator and 
family labor. The 26 week eligibility rule of Title II would have to 
be relaxed and compensation criteria linked to habitual seasonal 
employment patterns. The retraining and relocation elements of Title 
II worker assistance could play a role, particularly in the case where 
hired or contract labor is dominant.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Adjustment costs and economic losses that might occur if import 
restrictions or tariffs on sugar were eliminated have been estimated. 
While current adjustment assistance provisions under Title II of the 
1974 Trade Act could provide some compensation for these losses, the 
degree of coverage is likely to be small. Labor would be eligible for 
trade readjustment allowances (supplemental unemployment insurance) if 
employed for more than 26 weeks prior to being displaced. Since most 
sugar production and processing labor is seasonally employed (i.e., for 
less than 26 weeks) only a small proportion of the workers likely to be 
displaced would be eligible for compensation. Sizeable losses in 
income (profit) and asset value at both farm and processor levels would 
not be covered under existing legislation.
If the use of adjustment assistance as a means of compensating for 
trade-induced financial loss and thus a device to facilitate resource 
reallocation is accepted in principle, a program which would compensate 
the major affected groups in the sugar industry (or indeed in other 
agricultural industries) could be devised. Such a program would deal 
with income and asset value losses as well as seasonal nature of agri­
cultural employment. Lump-sum compensation provided through the pro­
gram would in the long run be cheaper than sustained import protection 
through tariffs or quotas, and the alternative of income support 
through deficiency payments.
Perhaps the principal stumbling-block to this type of program, 
particularly in the case of sugar, is not legislative complexity or the 
potential opposition of special interest groups, but the fundamental 
instability in the sugar market. The adjustment assistance concept is 
predicated on an assumption that a domestic industry that is currently 
uncompetitive is likely to be so, if not indefinitely, for a consider­
able period of time. Persistent supply and price instability in the 
world sugar market in recent years implies that such an assumption is 
not realistic. A necessary condition for the use of adjustment assis­
tance in the sugar industry may be the functioning of an effective 
stabilizing mechanism (e.g, a domestic or international stock) to 
guarantee some stability in the terms of trade, under which long-term 
decisions can be made. Other agricultural industries, for example, 
dairy, which do not suffer from the same degree of price Instability, 
may in fact be more suited to an adjustment assistance program as an 
alternative to import protection.
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